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Against Evidence-Based
Management, for Management
Learning
KEVIN MORRELL
Warwick Business School, U.K.
MARK LEARMONTH
Durham University Business School, U.K.
Evidence-based management has been widely advocated in management studies. It has
great ambition: All manner of organizational problems are held to be amenable to an
evidence-based approach. With such ambition, however, has come a certain narrowness that
risks restricting our ability to understand the diversity of problems in management studies.
Indeed, in the longer term, such narrowness may limit our capacity to engage with many real-
life issues in organizations. Having repeatedly heard the case for evidence-based
management, we invite readers to weigh the case against. We also set out an alternative
direction—one that promotes intellectual pluralism and flexibility, the value of multiple
perspectives, openness, dialogue, and the questioning of basic assumptions. These
considerations are the antithesis of an evidence-based approach, but central to a fully
rounded management education.
........................................................................................................................................................................
The “evidence-based” approach has been promoted
widely across a number of fields (Cartwright &
Hardie, 2012; Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007). In
management studies, following earlier contribu-
tions (e.g., Tranfield,Denyer, &Smart, 2003;Walshe&
Rundall, 2001), a landmark event increasing the
profile of evidence-based management (EBMgt) was
Denise Rousseau’s Presidential Address to the 2005
Academy of Management Conference (Rousseau,
2006a). There is now a dedicated handbook on EBMgt
(Rousseau, 2012), and there are several heavily cited
academic articles (e.g., Briner, Denyer, & Rousseau,
2009; Briner & Rousseau, 2011a; Rousseau, Manning,
& Denyer, 2008; Rynes, Giluk, & Brown, 2007), as well
as various other forums promoting EBMgt to man-
agement teachers and practitioners (e.g., Charlier,
Brown, & Rynes, 2011; Erez & Grant, 2014; Latham,
2009; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; Rousseau & McCarthy,
2007), including a Center for Evidence-based Man-
agement (CEBMa).
Evidence-based practice in management is re-
cently defined as
making decisions through the conscientious,
explicit and judicious use of the best available
evidence from multiple sources by
1. Asking: translating a practical issue or
problem into an answerable question
2.Acquiring: systematically searching for and
retrieving the evidence
3. Appraising: critically judging the trustwor-
thiness and relevance of the evidence
4. Aggregating: weighingandpulling together
the evidence
5. Applying: incorporating the evidence into
the decision-making process
6. Assessing: evaluating the outcome of the
decision taken
to increase the likelihood of a favorable out-
come (Barends, Rousseau, & Briner, 2014; em-
phases in original).
We are extremely grateful to the three anonymous reviewers who
were very generous in their detailed and supportive feedback, as
well as to AMLE Editor Christine Trank. All the views and any
errors in this article remain our own.
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There is a lot to commend in a vision of practice
informed by scholarship where managers exercise
careful, reasoned judgment; where their actions
are accountable because they are informed by ra-
tional, transparent, and fair processes; where they
draw sensibly on research. Our field has benefit-
ted in some areas from a renewed emphasis on
meta-analyses and related methods, and EBMgt
can sometimes help advise on how such methods
may bring about given goals within organizations
(Triantafillou, 2015). However, alongside others
(e.g., Arndt & Bigelow, 2009; Bartlett, 2011; Cassell,
2011; Guest, 2007; Hewison, 2004; Learmonth, 2006,
2008, 2009, 2011; Learmonth & Harding, 2006;
McLaughlin, 2004; Morrell, 2008, 2012; Tourish, 2013),
we argue EBMgt will not usher in the world it prom-
ises.We are “against” evidence-basedmanagement
because this movement defines evidence narrowly
and inflexibly, whereas problems in management
can always be understood in different ways and
from different perspectives. Also, and contrary to its
own stated values, EBMgt fails to question its as-
sumptions and is blind to criticism. These features
mean EBMgt is likely to lead to a greater distancing
of practice from research.
CritiqueofEBMgt is importantand timely. There is
a growing expectation throughout social science
that research outcomes be couched in a pervasive
“evidence-based” language,which isstarting toshape
expectations about what counts as legitimate social
science (Morrell & Lucas, 2012). Governments and re-
search funding agencies across the globe are more
and more mandating evidence-based knowledge—
even in contexts where such an approach can
fundamentally misunderstand the issues at hand—
ultimately leading to poorer results. For instance,
House (2006) and Lather (2004) outline the deleteri-
ous effects on educational research in the United
States, where there has come to be a dogmatic in-
sistence on narrow forms of “evidence” to solve any
and all research questions. Comparative case anal-
ysis of evidence-based programs in nonformal edu-
cation (in the U.S. and Kenya) finds that “the
dominant approach to making nonformal education
more evidence-based . . . is seriously flawed”
(Archibald, 2015: 146). In the United Kingdom, Hope’s
(2004) analysis of how an evidence-based approach
was actually applied by a major government de-
partment trying to reduce burglaries finds it was not
so much a case of seeing “what works,” but a case of
“pretend it works” (the title of Hope’s paper).
These sorts of problems have arisen, in part,
because the evidence-based movement (including
EBMgt) is inconsistent in important respects. Al-
though the factors are interrelated, to structure dis-
cussion, these inconsistencies canbeseparated into
three strands of critique:
1. EBMgt supposedly involves seeking out and
evaluating all evidence. Yet in practice, the
evidence-based approach has a selective and
narrow view of evidence.
2. EBMgt devalues stories or narrative forms of
knowledge. Yet the evidence-based approach is
itself a story about relations between research
and practice, one of many possible stories.
3. Despite claims to be scientific and impartial,
EBMgt is managerialist: i.e., it is for manage-
ment not about management.
Such sources of inconsistency can be traced back
to theearliestwriting onEBMgt, andall three feature
in contemporary work. Over time there have been
different emphases in its rhetoric; however, some-
thing discrete and distinctive can still be called
EBMgt, and in the pro-EBMgt literature, there re-
mains a very high degree of consensus in terms of
a core language, epistemological commitments,
andbeliefs. Somuch so, thatwe focus here onEBMgt
itself as an object of study, rather than discrete
contributions by its advocates. In doing so, we want
to consider the implications of this way of repre-
senting the relationship between research and
practice for management learning and education.
Our intent, therefore, is to analyze what EBMgt does:
how it frames relationships with practice, what it
counts and discounts as “evidence,” and whether it
is coherent and robust enough towarrant the kind of
uniform and wholesale change to our field that it
explicitly and repeatedly calls for. We recognize the
focus on what EBMgt “does” invites a logical error:
attributing agency to something that is a bundle of
talk, texts, andpractices. But it is difficult to separate
any movement from its advocates, and this seems
themost straightforward language touse in trying to
achieve that separation.
By showing there are serious inconsistencies
in EBMgt, we aim to scrutinize and challenge its
claims. To do sowe engage critically with the recent
2014 Special Issue (SI; volume 13, number 3) on
EBMgt in Academy of Management Learning & Ed-
ucation (AMLE) alongside a wide range of earlier
pro-EBMgt work. Our article also more broadly pro-
vides an opportunity to reenergize an on-going
conversation in AMLE about the limits to what we
can know and do as management researchers and
educators, given the complexities of the human
condition (Ghoshal, 2005; Grey, 2004).
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Weproceedbydevelopingour critique of EBMgt in
terms of the three inconsistencies set out above and
discussing their implications. We then propose al-
ternative intellectual values that aremore inclusive
and pluralist. These celebrate a wide range of dif-
ferent perspectives, including those influenced by
the humanities, as more appropriate for a rounded
approach tomanagement learningandeducation.A
more humanities-orientated perspective highlights
some of EBMgt’s blind spots and omissions, things
which may be harder to see from within the move-
ment. Doubtless our own blind spots and omissions
will be equally clear to others.
A SELECTIVE AND NARROW VIEW OF EVIDENCE
EBMgt has always been associated with broad am-
bitions, most recently expressed in the title of the
editorial of theAMLESI, inviting readers to “Change
the World” (Rynes et al., 2014). At the same time,
however, it has very narrow horizons in terms of
the construction of “evidence.” Even within health
sciences, a narrow view of evidence has been rec-
ognized as a problem. There, the evidence-based
movement has been criticized as “outrageously ex-
clusionary anddangerously normativewith regards
to scientific knowledge” (Holmes et al., 2006:180).We
believe this isalsoanaccuratedescriptionof EBMgt,
even though, taken as a whole, the discipline of man-
agement studies is far more diverse than health
sciences in terms of methods and approaches. In-
stead of acknowledging that there are radically
differentways of looking at the socialworld and that
such differences can be valuable, EBMgt excludes
and even denigrates scholarship from different tra-
ditions because it ranks themas inferior. This is true
even though EBMgt might at first glance appear to
welcome diversity in what counts as evidence:
When we say “evidence,” we basically mean
information. It may be based on numbers or it
may be qualitative or descriptive. Evidence
may come from scientific research suggesting
generally applicable facts about the world,
people, or organizational practices. Evidence
may also come from local organizational or
business indicators, such as company metrics
or observations of practice conditions. Even
professional experience can be an important
source of evidence, for example an entrepre-
neur’s past experience of setting up a variety
of businesses should indicate the approach
that is likely to be the most successful . . .
Regardless of its source, all evidence may be
included if it is judged to be trustworthy and
relevant (Barends, Rousseau, & Briner 2014;
italics in original).
At stake in this extract, however, is how we are to
judge what is “trustworthy and relevant.” What ul-
timately seems to count in EBMgt is quantification
and commensuration. As the same document later
argues:
• Forecasts or risk assessments based on the ag-
gregated (averaged) professional experience of
many people are more accurate than forecasts
based on one person’s personal experience . . .
• Professional judgments based on hard data or
statistical models are more accurate than judg-
ments based on individual experience . . .
• Knowledge derived from scientific evidence is
more accurate than the opinions of experts . . .
• Adecisionbasedon the combinationof critically
appraised experiential, organizational and sci-
entific evidence yields better outcomes than
a decision based on a single source of evidence
(2014: no page number).
In other words, what is really valued by EBMgt
are the sorts of characteristics prized in positivistic
research:
General law-like statements relating abstract
concepts, nominal and operational definitions
of terms; formal language such as logic or
mathematics used to express laws; derivation
of hypotheses; relations among variables; and
statistical analysis (Gartrell & Gartrell, 1996:
640).
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with positiv-
istic approaches to knowledge. We have published
positivistic research. Positivism does become prob-
lematic if it is held out as theonebestway to conduct
all research. Unfortunately, EBMgt presents itself in
this way and relies on positivistic techniques to do
so. That is why it promotes a narrow and singular
view of research that rests on highly contested as-
sumptions about the nature of the social world. For
example, and again in relation to the trustworthi-
ness of our cumulative knowledge, in the AMLE SI,
Kepes et al. propose a “[h]ierarchy of evidence to
assess evidence in the management literature”
(2014: 454), and by doing so strongly suggest the
universalization of positivistic assumptions. They
present a pyramid with six levels that echoes other
similar rankings in EBMgt (Tranfield et al., 2003).
This hierarchy is (as Kepes et al. explain) grafted
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onto amodel that originates in the reviewofmedical
evidence. Systematic reviews are at the top of this
evidence hierarchy (level 1); case studies and nar-
rative reviews one rung up from the bottom (level 5).
As a footnote to the pyramid there is a disclaimer:
“appropriateness of different research designs is
affected by, for instance, the particular research
question and the context (2014: 454).”
This pyramid is an excellent visual summary of
a key positivistic assumption in EBMgt: that aca-
demic research, indeed all forms of knowledge, can
be rankedusingonemetric.Wedonot think itmakes
sense to try to put all thework in a field as diverse as
management studies into so few categories, still
less to rank them using one common metric. The
disclaimer, “appropriateness of different research
designs is affected by...” is there because there is
a clear need to say something cautionary to ac-
company such sweeping generalization. But it
seems both obvious and redundant: like the packet
of nuts that reads, “warning: may contain nuts,” or
the sleeping pills that warn, “may cause drowsi-
ness.” Whereas may-contain-nuts and may-cause-
drowsiness disclaimers could seem redundant in
stating the obvious, they at least communicate ac-
tionable information. In contrast, the disclaimer,
“appropriateness of different research designs is
affected by . . .” is tokenism, because there is no
indication of what to do if such an evidence hierar-
chy does not apply. Indeed, the example included
rubs out the disclaimer, as the measure of quality
students are invited to consider is “Does the evi-
dence cited come from trustworthy cumulative re-
search (rather than from one case study)?” (Kepes
et al., 2014: 455).
This and similar rankings tell a celebratory story
about one form of “evidence.” They also denigrate
methods that do not fit EBMgt’s ideals. The best ev-
idence is seen as coming from sources that share an
impulse to reduce, quantify, and aggregate. If an
approach does not do this, for EBMgt, it is not just
different, it is inferior in the senseof ranking lower in
the hierarchy of evidence.
THE EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH IS A STORY,
ONE OF MANY POSSIBLE STORIES
The narrow and selective view of evidence in EBMgt
supports a story told by a particular community of
interest. An interesting feature of this story is that it
regularly devalues narrative forms of knowledge
(Morrell, 2008). EBMgt is most clearly antagonis-
tic toward stories when trying to create a ghetto
category: the narrative review. There are examples
of this sort of devaluation in the earliest literature in
the field (e.g., Tranfield et al., 2003). In the recent
AMLE SI, the antipathy toward narrative still comes
through clearly: “Literature reviews, even those
written by experts, can bemade to tell any story one
wants them to” (Briner & Walshe, 2014). Such deni-
gration is the basis on which EBMgt promotes the
comparative merits of the systematic review:
Traditional or narrative literature reviews . . .
cherry-pick research, may adopt a stance, and
include only evidence that tends to support
that position [and] summarize highly un-
representative samples of studies in an un-
systematic and uncritical fashion (Briner &
Walshe, 2014: 417).
Yet, just as there is a narrowness and selective-
ness in relation to evidence, there is a similarly se-
lective approach when it comes to promoting the
systematic review. Such arguments invariably
choose not to engage with criticisms of the system-
atic review. This is even though many authors in
different disciplines have been critical of the
systematic review (Clegg, 2005; Denzin, 2009;
Dixon-Woods et al., 2006; Evans & Pearson, 2001;
Hammersley, 2001; Larner, 2004; Morrell, 2008;
Roberts, 2000; Suri, 2013). There is no mention of
these criticisms—what one might call counterfac-
tual or contradictory “evidence”—in Briner and
Walshe’s review, and no hint that there has been
criticism of the systematic review approach (see
also more recently, Boell & Cecez-Kecmanovic,
2015). In other words, their review exemplifies the
very sort of cherry-picking it ostensibly condemns.
EBMgt struggleswith inconsistencywhen it comes
to narrative because it is telling a story. Telling
stories is something scholars across all disciplines
do, but the unique problem EBMgt has, and that it
has created for itself, is that it has to maintain an
antipathy to stories. This is because the thingswhich
give stories their character—idiosyncrasy, individu-
ality, unique details, and difference—are all things
that need to be subordinated to pursue an evidence
base. But in trying to maintain this antagonism to
stories, EBMgt hampers its own claims. For example,
hierarchies of evidence tell a story by showing sys-
tematic reviewsat the topandnarrative reviewsmuch
lower down. But on their own terms, these hierar-
chies should not be taken as especially trustworthy:
After all, they are promoted in narrative reviews (just
as every argument for a systematic review is).
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What does EBMgt leave behind when it dismisses
stories? To illustrate their value, consider this de-
scription of an incident from an article by Korczynski
(2011: 1430–14311). It is fromaparticipant-observation
study, when he worked for 3 months in what he de-
scribes as a “taylorized factory” that makes window
blinds:
Day 34 was Gloria’s last day after having
worked there for 15 years. She hadmademany
good friends on the shop floor. These friends
gathered all the workers in the room around
Gloria to give her a leaving present. One of
the presents was a blind—this itself caused
laughter all round. After it was presented,
Ginny took the blind, cut a large hole in the
middle and hadGloria pose for photoswith her
head poking through the cut-up blind.
This briefest of stories, referring to one incident in
one case, shows how pursuing a logic of similar-
ity and accumulation of evidence is not the only
worthwhile thing to do when studying organiza-
tions. While ethnographies can be designed to ac-
cumulate evidence, and while meta-ethnography is
appropriate in some situations (e.g., Hodson, 2004),
Korczynski’s study shows people in the midst of
drudgery and routine satirizing and joking about
work. In doing this they impose control and impart
a sense of unique significance to events in an envi-
ronmentwhereall theworkpressuresare to conform
and routinize. Amid the drudgery and repetition in
this factory, this moment is unique and human, and
because it involves humor, the particular context is
of prime, irreducible importance.
The factory, an analog for thousands of other such
places, is a setting where humanity is flattened and
smoothed by impersonal, industrial forces of tech-
nology, aggregation, and standardization. This
same logic underpins EBMgt, because diversity and
variety are what the EBMgt approach overlooks, ig-
nores, or writes out in its search for determining
“the” evidence, and that alone is ample reason to
resist its logic. The story of Gloria’s last day should
not be something we appraise in terms of whether
we can make it equivalent with other incidents to
aggregate them altogether, because the story cher-
ishesamoment andprivilegesavoice. It is evidence
and moreover—directly contrary to the logic of
EBMgt—it is trustworthy evidence precisely be-
cause it is a rich account of the particular, and about
things that are not commensurable. Korczynski’s
work is telling us something profound about
somethingmundane, which is what the best science
across different fields has always done.
EVIDENCE-BASED MANAGEMENT
IS MANAGERIALIST
Whenever we consider an individual case, rather
than an aggregated and impersonal mass of evi-
dence, the experience of doing so brings us closer to
more critical questions about “management.” The
spoof present is, after all, a form of resistance, and
what closely follows questions about resistance are
questions of ethics: Is this situation “right” or “fair?”
Could it be different?
EBMgt has only recently begun to acknowledge
the importance of ethics explicitly (Morrell, 2008). To
address ethical questions carefully often requires
consideration of contingencies: the circumstances
and histories of the individuals involved; micro-
politics, traditions, characteristics, and conditions
in that workplace; its political, economic, geo-
graphic, andhistorical context; the situation in other
settings; financial and legal information; the nature
of work in wider society, and so on. It also requires
explicit consideration of the play of power. Critical
ethnographies can equip us to grapple with these
kinds of complexities, but it is harder to see a role for
EBMgt in considering situated complexity, given
that its focus is firmly on accumulating evidence.
We know from decades of such critical research, if
not from our own working lives, that there are often
no unambiguous or unanimous solutions to di-
lemmas in the workplace. There are often irrecon-
cilable tensions between fairness and care on the
onehand,andprofit or efficiencyon theother (King&
Learmonth, 2015).
“We know from decades of critical
research, if not from our own working lives,
that there are often no unambiguous or
unanimous solutions to dilemmas in the
workplace. There are often irreconcilable
tensions between fairness and care on the
one hand, and profit or efficiency on the
other.”
To understand politics, power, and ethics, rather
than beginning with a search for best available
evidence we would first need to consider more
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fundamental questions—the framing of the situation—
because this would influence how we defined
“right,” or “fair.” In all likelihood, thiswould require
taking care about how exactly one understood
the role of “management.” In considering such
fundamentals, we would need to be mindful of the
limits and benefits of our way of framing the situa-
tion, our “way of seeing”andwould be aware others
would see it differently. This is something that eth-
nographers pay great attention to, as it is core to
their craft.
In contrast, in seeking to quantify and aggregate,
EBMgt denies agreat deal of people’s experiences of
their day-to-day dilemmas. We have already ac-
knowledged (uncontroversially we hope) that to ask
“what is right, or fair?” is to ask difficult questions
about ethics andpolitics. But then, formanagers and
employees the question is not even as simple as
that. We very rarely ask in the abstract “what is
fair?” or “what is right?” what we ask is, “is this
situation fair?” or, “what is fair here?” and “what is
the right thing to do here?” The complexities and
challenges of what to do “here” are everyday, exis-
tential questions for many managers and workers.
For some, this “here” is the essence of managing
people, and very often it is not answered by looking
“there”—whether that is in another workplace, or in
an aggregated and simplified body of evidence.
Questions relating to ethics and politics are
a challenge to evidence-based approaches, be-
cause they often cannot be thought of in aggregated
terms. Each setting, such as the factory on Gloria’s
last day, is different and needs to be seen on its own
merits, not necessarily in relation to a body of evi-
dence. If EBMgt promotes the idea that answers to
ethical and political problems can come from look-
ing at aggregated evidence, it will alienate people
whoknow from their dailywork experienceand from
the simplest and shortest conversations they have
with colleagues, that the picture is more complex. It
is admirable to look for solutions to problems, but
not knowing the best way to approach decisions, or
the best way to approach a problem, can be ex-
tremely valuable because it can encourage people
to take care. Rather than a sense of humility and
care, to propose theevidence-basedapproachas the
one best solution is encouraging a false sense of
confidence.
EBMgt struggles with questions of ethics and
politics because alongside the narrow view of “evi-
dence,” is a narrow view of “management.” EBMgt
risks losing sight of the critical perspective to the
study and teaching of management: the view from
below (e.g., Collinson & Tourish, this issue; Grey,
2004; Learmonth, 2007). In theory one could use
evidence-based principles to promote workers’ in-
terests against those of the management, but “in
theory” is where this idea is likely to be destined
to remain. The unexamined assumption made
throughout the EBMgt narrative is that managers
are clients—as well as being neutral, technical
experts—with no personal or collective stake in the
issues being researched. Consequently, managers’
own problems and dilemmas become the obvious,
and apparently unproblematic, starting point for
evidence-based analyses. One example of people
being trained to see the world in this way comes in
the AMLE SI:
[S]tudents teamupwith other students towork
as consultants for a company. They have to
find a client (i.e., a manager), identify and
define a problem of interest to the manager,
establish a plan for executing the evidence-
based problem-solving steps . . . and give
a recommendation to the manager for ad-
dressing the problem at the end of the project
(Dietz et al., 2014: 401–402).
Such “evidence” championed by EBMgt ends up
serving power (Baritz, 1960). It does so because it
makes corporate interest the starting point for
scientific inquiry. Nowotny et al.’s (2001: 52) ob-
servation about scientists generally, that “in too
many cases scientists adopted the language of
and aligned themselves to the powerful and priv-
ileged” seems true of EBMgt—the powerful and
privileged are EBMgt’s clients. This problem is
compounded, as Critical theorists have shown,
because one danger of claims to science or “evi-
dence” is that they can naturalize dominant in-
terests: They can mean that groups who are
marginalized become further marginalized, or
even invisible (Deetz, 2003).
An absence of reflection about power relations
is essentially what makes EBMgt managerialist.
Problems of “management” are not seen as the
product of a set of relations under a particular
political-economic system, or formof government, or
as in any way sociohistorical, or as ethically and
politically fraught, or as one category alongside
another countervailing category of problems of
“labor” or “society.” Instead, the problems of man-
agement are presented as natural and universal, in
everybody’s interests to resolve in specific ways. In
this light, it is revealing to ask where, in the whole
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EBMgt canon is any mention of that large body of
evidence produced from decades of organizational
ethnographies which consider, “how power is ex-
ercised, control asserted and maintained, conflict
and resistance expressed, and social inequalities
manipulated and recreated” (Smith, 2001: 224)? No
such ethnographic work is included at all, as far as
wecan identify. It hasbeen recognized for some time
that qualitative work can be harder to synthesize,
but the reasons critical ethnographies are absent
from EBMgt are unlikely to be principally about
methods and epistemology; they more likely reflect
an uncritical gaze on management.
CONSEQUENCES FOR MANAGEMENT LEARNING
AND EDUCATION
For all its inconsistencies, EBMgt is—andwill likely
remain—influential in management learning and
education. In capturing a zeitgeist, its continuation
serves a range of institutional interests—not least,
the interests of governments and research funders,
aswell as the needs of business schools to beable to
show that theyengagewithpractice (Kieser, Nicolai,
& Seidl, 2015). Given this is the case, what are the
likely consequences of a continuing institutionali-
zation of EBMgt?
Beginning in very broad terms, EBMgt can be read
as the latest intervention ina long-runningdebate in
management studies about the relativemerits of the
humanities and the sciences. In this debate the sci-
ences and the humanities often still get portrayedas
polar-opposite rivals, as “two cultures” (Snow, 1959/
1993) competing ferociously in the market place of
ideas over how theworld should be studied (Cascio,
2007). It is also a debate in which, historically within
the business school sector, a constellation of actors
and institutions have combined to promote our
field’s tieswith the sciencesandmathematics, at the
relative expense of the humanities (O’Connor, 2008;
Gagliardi & Czarniawska, 2006). With this reading,
EBMgt can be portrayed as a radical intervention
that is asmuchanti-humanities as it is pro-sciences.
This broader discursive context may explain why
EBMgt remains blind to what the humanities have
always prized: the value of critical reflection on per-
sonal, communal, and intuitive experience (Kostera,
2012). These things necessarily fall outside what is
traditionally represented as the objective domains of
“scientific” inquiry.
Perhaps particularly in relation to management
learning, we would emphasize the equal impor-
tance of learning from disciplines rooted in the
humanities. This would include, for example, the
study of literature, history, philosophy, narrative,
and human culture. These forms of scholarship are
often intrinsically associated with critique and
emancipation but currently go unmentioned or are
explicitly devalued in EBMgt. (For recent reviews of
these topics in the context of management studies,
see, e.g., Hibbert et al., 2014; Michaelson, 2015;
Saggurthi & Thakur, 2014). The learning implica-
tions of this kind of pluralism are neatly expressed
by Colby et al. (2011: 4) in their assertion that
to contribute to the larger life of society, stu-
dents must be able to draw upon varied bodies
of knowledge . . . to gain fluency in looking at
issues from multiple points of view, which re-
quires the opportunity to explore with others
different ways of posing problems and de-
fining purposes.
We read “students” here to include ourselves,
colleagues, and colleagues-to-be; undergraduates
and future undergraduates; MBAs and future MBAs;
managers, workers, and wider society. In manage-
ment studiesweneed to “drawuponvariedbodies of
knowledge” and use “multiple points of view” as
well as “explorewith others differentways of posing
problems and defining purpose.” As Nowotny et al.
(2001:19) argue, it is
the merging together of different ways of
knowingand their inbuilt rivalry for legitimacy
and challenge to the respective monopoly of
the other way of knowing, which produces
heterogeneity, pluralism and fuzziness.
Nowotny et al.’s (2001) idea of fuzziness is partic-
ularly helpful. There is no place for fuzziness on the
smooth slopes of EBMgt’s pyramids, but in thinking
about learning and education “heterogeneity, plu-
ralism and fuzziness” are to be celebrated at some
level are they not? The infinite variety of contexts in
which “evidence” is encountered and made sense
of by managers and others in organizations from
nonacademic “thought worlds” (Cascio, 2007: 1009),
makes uncertainty, fuzziness, and difference in-
evitable. Furthermore, there are dangers if we avoid
or ignore these kinds of factors because we can end
up “knowing” things we don’t know, which is igno-
rance, not enlightenment.
In the context of management learning, perhaps
the biggest flaw in EBMgt is its closed-mindedness.
This repeatedly displays itself through an inability
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to respond to anything but the mildest criticism.
While EBMgt has changed in terms of softening its
rhetoric, the record (e.g., Charlier, 2014; Rousseau,
2006b; Briner & Rousseau, 2011b; Rynes et al., 2014),
reveals an inability to respond adequately to chal-
lenging questions about its basic values and as-
sumptions. This is especially the case for criticisms
coming from outside its own paradigm—in which
case they tend to be misunderstood or dismissed
as mere “grumbles” (Bartunek, 2011). For in-
stance, at the time of writing, the CEBMa website
states in the section, Articles on Evidence-Based
Management:
Here you can find allmajor articles on evidence-
based practice in the field of management as
well as related topics such as management ed-
ucation, the practice-knowledge gap, method-
ology and systematic reviews.
This website lists dozens of articles on evidence-
based management, but it includes no articles crit-
ical of EBMgt (of the type cited earlier here). Another
example of EBMgt’s refusal to engage in critique,
this time from within the AMLE SI, comes during
Steven Charlier’s interview with Gary Latham
(Charlier, 2014: 472):
[Charlier:] “Some critics of EBMgt have stated
that unlike medical research, ‘evidence’ from
management research . . . features ‘paradig-
matic disagreement’ over what should be con-
sidered as ‘evidence’” (Learmonth & Harding,
2006). How would you respond to these
criticisms?
[Latham:] “I have close friendswhoaremedical
doctors. They can’t agree on whether a preg-
nant woman should take aspirin! This issue is
not at all unique to our field.”
The response ignores a fundamental, first-order
criticism about paradigmatic disagreement, and
repackages it as a second-order question of prac-
tice. The SI’s editorial introduction (Rynes et al.,
2014) contains a parallel example. Trank’s (2014)
emphasis on the reader and the construction of
meaning challenges basic epistemological as-
sumptions in EBMgt. However, these first-order
criticisms are again ignored, and Rynes et al.
(2014: 311) defend more specific, second-order
criticisms:
A related issue Trank raises is her concern that
the evidence-based movement may produce
“neutral technical experts” no longer commit-
ted to “values transcending the immediate and
the practical” (Freidson, 2001: 209). At least in
theory, this should not happen because EBP
visualizes practitioners as professionals who
use personal experience, knowledge of the
local context, and stakeholder preferences—
in addition to research findings—in making
decisions.
This selective response supports Trank’s (2014:
392) characterization of EBMgt:
Although practitioners are said to “disbelieve,
dismiss, or simply ignore findings from scien-
tific research” (Giluk&Rynes, 2012: 130), it could
be said that advocates of EBMgt “disbelieve,
dismiss or simply ignore” critical treatments of
EBMgt, and cling, just as “resistant” practi-
tioners do, to their prior beliefs and practices.
Even when radical criticisms have come from
within the EBMgtmovement itself, they are ignored.
For instance, the introduction to The Oxford Hand-
book of Evidence-Based Management (Rousseau,
2012) sanitizes and repackages the book’s two crit-
ical chapters (Hodgkinson, 2012; Hornung, 2012; see
Morrell et al., 2015 for a more detailed discussion).
Such myopia in the face of criticism is a hallmark
of dogma. Ignoring all counterfactual and contra-
dictory criticisms damages EBMgt’s self-appointed
status as the authority on “evidence.” Although ev-
idence is crucial to the scientific method, another
crucial consideration is the need for continual
skepticism. In the specific context of management
learning there is something particularly troubling
about a movement that steers readers and students
away from critique, in an attempt to reinforce pre-
existing beliefs and practices.
“Such myopia in the face of criticism is
a hallmark of dogma. Ignoring all
counterfactual and contradictory criticisms
damages EBMgt’s self-appointed status as
the authority on ‘evidence.’”
EBMgt also propagates an oversimplification
about management and management research. This
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oversimplification expresses itself by denying
diversity and variety, leading to, at best, par-
tially adequate accounts of important phenomena,
and at worst damaging reductionism. To sustain
its postivistic way of talking about the social world
and the problems we face, and to be able to talk
plausibly about cumulative knowledge, system-
atic reviews, best evidence, what works and so on,
EBMgt has to turn away from the things that are
more difficult to represent using this discourse. It
necessarily has to reduce, simplify, gloss, flatten,
or sideline problems and situations that are in-
extricably contextual, messy, unique, contestable,
oppressive, absurd, humorous, or socially com-
plex in dozens of otherways. In otherwords, EBMgt
eliminates the diversity of frames and issues that
characterize any context—and yet these are the
sorts of things at the heart of day-to-day work, and
life, for managers and employees. They are the
very stuff of stories. We edit them at our peril.
In sum, then, in terms of its impact on manage-
ment learning, EBMgt does not draw on varied
bodies of knowledge or merge different ways of
knowing, because it is committed to there being
a hierarchy of evidence. Rather than exploring pur-
poses with others or tolerating rivalry and plural-
ism, EBMgt excludes or ignores criticism. And it will
never encourage fluency in takingmultiple points of
view, or encourage rivalry across ways of knowing,
because of its strong commitment to the single par-
adigm of positivism as the best way to tackle all
organizational problems.
DISCUSSION
There is anage-old tradition of seeing science as the
route to changing the world: Archimedes famously
saidall heneeded tomove theworldwasa lever and
aplace to stand. This analogy is a rich one for EBMgt
in so far as it relies on “evidence” as its lever to
“change the world.” But the problem is that EBMgt
lacks Archimedes’ insight. He knew there was no
extra-worldly independent and stable point on
which to stand; this absence of a place to stand is
certainly true of management studies. We are
enmeshed with our world and cannot simply apply
scientific instruments to it as if we were inde-
pendent or detached, as EBMgt assumes. In the
study of management, and of other social sciences,
our theories about the world also make the world,
and so claims to knowledge are always going to
be contested and contestable (Ghoshal, 2005). This
idea is well understood within the philosophy of
scientific knowledge (Feyerabend, 1993; Gibbons
et al., 1994; Hacking, 1983; Latour, 1987; Nowotny
et al., 2001; Woolgar, 1988).
In management studies, we cannot describe the
issues we face or the concepts we study from an in-
dependent standpoint. The terms we use are value-
laden and politically charged. This is true of our
most basic concepts:manager, leader, performance,
team, and so on. They are essentially contested.
What is more, the terms we use do not simply
describe a world; they bring a particular world
into being (Gond et al., 2015). For these reasons,
“[p]eculiar to management is the extent of frag-
mentation and indeterminacy in its knowledge
base … The extent to which its knowledge claims
are open to contest and disruption is highly unusual
and possibly unique” (Grey & Willmott, 2002: 413).
Moreover, it is because we are implicated in the
world we study that
social scientists carry an even greater social
and moral responsibility than those who work
in the physical sciences because, if they hide
ideology in the pretense of science, they can
cause much more harm (Ghoshal, 2005: 87).
EBMgt hides ideology in the pretense of science
because it is a narrow and exclusionary perspective
that discounts other ways of seeing the social world
and its social problems—those based on the belief
there is “ontological discontinuity between natural
and social phenomena” (Knights, 2008: 543). Apply-
ing Knights’ phrase to management, if you believe
every person is unique and different from every
other person in important ways, then you sign up to
some form of ontological discontinuity. The same is
true if you believe every social situation is unique
and different from every other social situation in
importantways. It is also true if youbelieve even our
most sophisticated measures and techniques can
never capture all the intricacies of (to give one ex-
ample) the simplest everyday human conversation.
If this idea of ontological discontinuity has any
purchase, EBMgt will never be the catch-all solution
to problems in management.
What then are the implications of our analysis?We
explicitly do not propose “an” alternative. EBMgt may
notbe theonebestway,but thatdoesnotmean there is
another one best way. Proposing one alternative
would be inconsistent with our critique because we
advocate pluralism—a striking departure from an
approach that is monolithic. Nor do we propose alter-
natives that rely on the rhetoric of “evidence” in some
528 DecemberAcademy of Management Learning & Education
way. Within today’s wider culture, an “evidence-
based” rhetoric (or even an “evidence-informed,” “ev-
idence-aware,” rhetoric, etc.) is inexorably tiedupwith
a reductionist and exclusionary model of what counts
asknowledge—asmuch inmanagement studies as in
other disciplines. There is, in other words, too much
rubble to clear if we begin with talk of “evidence.”We
are also cautious in framing the implications of this
critique because we want to try to avoid any repack-
aging or appropriation of the paper. We have no wish
for it to be recast as in somewaydesigned toassist the
development of the EBMgt project or to be suggesting
ways forward for EBMgt (selective repackaging has
beenaresponse toearliercritique,seee.g., Learmonth,
2006 and Rousseau’s, 2006b response).
Therefore, instead of an alternative, or alterna-
tives to EBMgt, we propose pluralism as the antith-
esis of EBMgt. Recognizing difference in intellectual
traditions and celebrating their respective contri-
butions is important not because it will lead to the
triumph of the humanities over the sciences; rather,
because pluralism promotes a balance between
them as complementary ways of thinking about the
problems facing people in work organizations. Each
of us, as individual scholars or practitioners may
well have different interests, values, and skills, but
we nevertheless can have mutual respect for dif-
ferent perspectives and views, and rather than
devaluing forms of knowledge that do not fit our
preconceptions, or pretending that other forms of
knowledge donot exist, we can take other traditions’
ideas and methods seriously, and see them as po-
tentially valuable. This position is in line with ana-
lyses of the role of scienceandknowledge inmodern
society. For Gibbons et al. (1994: 4), for example,
“socially distributed knowledge” captures the idea
that the solution to a problem may be beyond the
ability of any one discipline to solve (whether in the
sciences or the humanities). As one of our reviewers
expressed it, the aim should be “an appreciation of
diversity, different points of view, stakes and interests
and, as a consequence, not one single right way but
rather the options that are available in a situation
that an evidence-based approach usually prevents
people from seeing (personal communication).”
For example, we find the narrative review (which
EBMgt derides because it can be made to tell any
story one wants) inspiring and liberating. Readers
of reviews are never passive dupes, falling for
any argument the author constructs. They respond
(Trank, 2014), and there ismore scope to respondand
construct when the possibilities of format and genre
are less constrained. More fundamentally, being
able to tell different stories by reviewing knowledge
is emancipating. It is emancipating in terms of its
possibilities for generating new theory and for
learning; it is also emancipating in terms of howwe
relate things to life:where one idealmanyshare is to
be able to tell any story we want to tell. These pos-
sibilities demand more of the reader, and therefore,
they can also encourage learning in the sense of
looking at old problems in new ways and raising
new questions. In a very different context, Einstein
and Infeld (1938: 95) explain that
[t]he formulation of a problem is often more
essential than its solution, which may be
merely a matter of mathematical or experi-
mental skills. To raise new questions, new
possibilities, to regard old problems from
a new angle, requires creative imagination
and marks real advance in science.
While we cannot sensibly aggregate and make
commensurate some narrative forms of knowledge,
an inability to do so certainly does not mean we
cannot learn from narrative. We learn on a different
basis, fromadifferent way of seeing. This difference
is partly about methods and a different under-
standing of what constitutes worthwhile knowl-
edge, but it is also about a different understanding
of what being human means. It involves Knight’s
(2008) commitment to ontological discontinuity: the
primacy and irreducibility of some differences
relating to the person, time, or place. Some case
studies may be aggregated, but those that perhaps
should not be aggregated, such as Korczynski’s
(2011), are “trustworthy”precisely because they help
us see what is different and unique about a particu-
lar world of work. Drawing attention to uniqueness
is sometimes the purpose of a narrative or case
study (Siggelkow, 2007), and case studies often have
an entirely different goal from accumulation. They
may be intended, for example, to convey the rich-
nessand complexities of a situation, andofwhat it is
to be human, rather than a resource to be managed,
or a problem to be solved.
We are essentially against evidence-based man-
agement because issues in management can al-
ways be understood in a variety of ways and
from different perspectives. An appreciation of
difference—never knowing for certain even what
approach to take to a problem—is what should keep
us, as scholars, thoughtful and critically reflexive in
the kinds of knowledge claims we make. A great
many of our stakeholders are also thoughtful and
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critical; indeed this is perhaps true of thosewewant
to reach and inspire the most: They realize their
world is complex and believe there are no universal
approaches. Pluralism is a better basis for lear-
ningful dialogue than an evidence-based mega-
phone. The EBMgt story is now well rehearsed and
polished. It is familiar and unconvincing to many,
but those hearing it for the first time are as likely to
wonder about its essential legitimacy, its exclu-
sionary character, and its inconsistencies. They are
likely to ask, “who are you to tell me what evidence
is?” Many managers, employees, or members of so-
ciety will resist the idea that all the most important
questions they face, or even themostmundane ones,
can be answered by looking at “a body of evidence.”
Our stakeholders are often keen to learn about the
latest andmost insightful research, but thenmany of
them are most engaged when they hear our stories.
Rather than denigrate and devalue narrative forms
of knowledge or sacrifice them on the altar of evi-
dence, we advocateworkingwith and through them.
CONCLUSION
As long-standing critics of EBMgt, we acknowledge
professional stakes in this debate. However, our
critique does not spring from any dogmatic position
in terms of certain methods or favoring a particular
epistemology. Our goal is not to promote any single
alternative way of looking at the world. We encour-
age readers to weigh the case against EBMgt, and
even to do so following evidence-based principles.
Please be “conscientious, explicit, and judicious”
(Rynes et al., 2014: 305) because doing so in light of
our critique raises questions for this movement:
1. Does a conscientious, (i.e., careful and scrupu-
lous) evaluation of EBMgt support its claim to be
the one way to address organizational prob-
lems; the one way to engage with practice; an
approach informed purely by the evidence?Our
critique indicates not, rather, that it is just one
account of one way to do these things.
2. IsEBMgtexplicit, (i.e., openandunreserved)when
it comes to interests and basic assumptions, be-
cause it prizes transparency, independence and
objectivity and commits to a replicable procedure
for synthesizing knowledge in search of an in-
dependently real “evidence base”? Our critique
indicates not, rather, that it relies on basic and
unexamined ideological assumptions about the
world, and that it is promoted by, and benefits,
people trained to see the world in that way.
3. To be judicious, (i.e., to weigh the case for and
against EBMgt), does it basically hang together
or hold true? Again our critique rejects this
movement in the wake of inconsistencies.
EBMgt is itself a story about relations between
research and practice, and its most persuasive
work relies heavily on stories, but at the same
time, so much of the discourse on “evidence”
deliberately positions stories as an untrust-
worthy form of evidence. Moreover, EBMgt
presses users to seek out all available and rel-
evant evidence, but arguments for EBMgt are
invariably one-sided and built on a selective
picture of the evidence on EBMgt itself.
The caseagainst EBMgt, using its ownprinciples, is
compelling. But the brilliant danger of an “evidence-
based” slogan is that it can still appear obvious, even
as common sense. After all, who can be “against” ev-
idence? Many—including politicians, policy makers,
funding bodies, and senior managers—claim to be
adherents of an evidence-based approach. Without
questioning their intentions, perhaps when they do
this they forget to reflect on the wider implications.
Perhaps they forget to think through whose interests
the approach serves, and whose interests it excludes.
We are “for” evidence, we just do not think the EBMgt
movement, with its inconsistencies and narrowness,
should have any monopoly or any kind of special au-
thority when it comes to evidence.
Just as we are “against” EBMgt but “for” evi-
dence, we are also “for” other values. In particular,
we emphasize things we see as fundamental to
management learning, yet antithetical to EBMgt:
pluralism, critical reflexivity, questioning of basic
assumptions, intellectual flexibility. If you agree
that thismovement threatens these values, we ask
you to take a similar stand “against” EBMgt: Re-
fuse to use the rhetoric and question those who do.
Where EBMgt is held out as the one best way,
question this dogma through your institutions,
networks, and roles as scholars and managers, as
educators and learners. In challenging EBMgt,
make the case for richer and more inclusive un-
derstandings of evidence, and make the case for
a richer and more inclusive approach to manage-
ment learning.
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